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Ethnic Parties, Ethnic Tensions? Results of an Original
Election Panel Study
Anaı¨d Flesken University of Bristol
Abstract: Ethnic diversity is considered detrimental to national unity, especially if ethnicity is politically mobilized: Ethnic
parties in electoral competition in particular are thought to increase the salience of ethnic differences and, with it,
ethnic tensions. Yet the individual links of this psychological chain have only been examined cross-sectionally, and never
together. This article employs original longitudinal survey data to simultaneously assess changes in ingroup identification,
outgroup aversion, and national identification over the election period within one diverse society: Romania. While ingroup
identification does increase, ethnic relations do not worsen. On the contrary, outgroup aversion decreases while national
identification increases, for minority and majority Romanian citizens alike. I explain these findings with the common
ingroup identity model from social psychology: Elections in ethnically diverse societies may not only increase the salience of
ethnic groups but also that of the superordinate, national identity. The findings question the often assumed automaticity of
intergroup threat.
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this arti-
cle are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at:
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ICISE4.
Ethnic diversity is often seen to be detrimental tonational unity, especially if ethnicity is used as abasis for political mobilization. Ethnic parties in
particular are viewed with concern, as they are thought
to politicize ethnic differences not only in policy but also
in public discourse (Brancati 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch,
and Hug 2012; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Sambanis
and Shayo 2013). This politicization raises the salience
of ethnic difference in the population, increasing ingroup
cohesion and outgroup rivalry and undermining national
unity (see also Fearon and Laitin 2000; Lieberman and
Singh 2012). Feared to foster ethnic polarization, ethnic
parties have been banned (Bogaards, Basedau, and Hart-
mann 2010; Ishiyama and Breuning 1998) or excluded
from party assistance (Kumar 2004).
Some studies contest this polarization framework, ar-
guing that ethnic polarization may be prevented through
interest representation via ethnic parties, which, they ar-
gue, furthers feelings of political inclusion amongminori-
ties (Birnir 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010;
Ishiyama 2009). But while studies on both sides of the
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debate implicitly or (more rarely) explicitly locate the
mechanism between politicization and polarization in
psychological processes among the people constituting
the different ethnic groups, this mechanism has not been
studieddirectly: Little attentionhas beenpaid tohowpeo-
ple perceive ethnic politicization and how politicization
affects ethnic relations and national unity (see also Fox
and Miller-Idriss 2008; Green and Seher 2003; Ishiyama
2011).
Only recently have studies begun closing this gap.
Eifert and colleagues (2010) examine the salience of eth-
nic identities in cross-sectional surveys of 10 sub-Saharan
African countries and find that it tends to be stronger
nearer elections, particularly if these are more competi-
tive. Higashijima and Nakai (2016) follow a similar em-
pirical strategy in the Baltic states and conclude that eth-
nic identification strengthenswith electoralmobilization.
Both studies examine ingroup identification only, not al-
lowing inferences to changes in ethnic relations. In this
article, I make the often implicitly assumed links between
ethnic politicization, identification, and ethnic relations
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explicit. I then employ an original longitudinal survey to
adjudicate between different theories on the effects of eth-
nic politicization by simultaneously assessing changes in
ingroup identification, outgroup aversion, and national
identification over the election period within one ethni-
cally diverse democracy: Romania. Although I find an in-
crease in ingroup identification, I do not find evidence for
worsening ethnic relations over this period. On the con-
trary, outgroup aversion decreases while national identi-
fication increases, for minority and majority Romanian
citizens alike.
I explain these—from the perspective of the ethnic
politics literature—unexpected findings with the com-
mon ingroup identity model from social psychology (see
Gaertner and Dovidio 2009): Elections in ethnically di-
verse societies not only increase the salience of ethnic
groups but may also increase that of the common super-
ordinate, national identity. People hence see each other
as fellow members of a shared group, and as a result,
antagonism between the subordinate groups decreases.
The argument is motivated by findings from social and
political psychology that question the automaticity of in-
tergroup threat, as understood in the literature on ethnic
politics. Yet alternative theories to intergroup threat, such
as intergroup contact theory and its offshoot, the com-
mon ingroup identity model, have so far been overlooked
in the study of ethnic politics—perhaps due to, first, the
field’s strong focus on antagonistic intergroup relations
and, second, its focus on ethnic identities at the expense of
other identity dimensions, despite the constructivist liter-
ature’s insistence that people have amultiplicity of identi-
ties whose salience depends on the context (see Chandra
2012).
Aside from the theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions, the article also makes two methodological con-
tributions. First, I use data from an original two-wave
survey panel conducted before and after Romania’s 2016
electoral period. In contrast to cross-sectional surveys,
panel surveys interview the same individuals at several
timepoints. This allows identifying not only aggregate
but also individual change over time, and as such for
more confident identification of causality (Lynn 2009).
Second, data collection was stratified by ethnic group re-
lations, drawing representative samples of the politically
and numerically dominant ethnic Romanian population
and the nondominant Hungarian population, as well as
of ethnic Romanians living in counties where Hungar-
ians represent the majority.1 This design allows for a
more careful testing of the assumptions underlying the
1In the following, the dominant group is also referred to as “ma-
jority” and the nondominant group also as “minority.”
competing theories on intergroup relations, as any ef-
fect of ethnic politicization should be particularly pro-
nounced among this third sample.
The Effects of Elections in Ethnically
Diverse Societies
Intergroup Threat
Studies on elections in ethnically diverse societies are pre-
dominantly based on theories of intergroup threat (see
also Fearon and Laitin 2000). According to intergroup
threat theory, relationships across ethnic group bound-
aries tend to be hostile rather than harmonious: We tend
to showopposition to the outgroupwhile favoring our in-
group. This ingroup bias increases with the perception of
threat to the ingroup by the outgroup, that is, especially
in times of danger or contention (see Stephan, Ybarra,
and Rios Morrison 2009). In electoral competition for
political power, group members may perceive a threat
through the respective outgroup, particularly when the
ethnic boundary is emphasized by political actors like
ethnic parties.
Elections in ethnically diverse societies may therefore
polarize ethnic relations by politicizing them (see also
Michelitch 2015). Figure 1 depicts the hypothesized links
of the chain in this polarization framework. First, ethnic
politicization affects attitudes predominantly by making
ethnicity and ethnic differences more salient, such that
thought processes—and behavior—aremore strongly in-
fluenced by ingroup–outgroup considerations (link A).
Eifert and colleagues (2010) show that, across 22 survey
rounds in 10 sub-Saharan African countries, respondents
were more likely to emphasize their ethnic identity over
other identities the closer the survey was conducted to an
election.
In consequence, the theory goes, ingroup identifica-
tion increases (link B). Not only does electoral competi-
tion make people more aware of the existence of ethnic
differences, but also their ethnic identity becomes more
important to them as a result. The mechanism may be
either cognitive (Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002)
or rational (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010): People may
increasingly recognize a “utility of sticking together” dur-
ing election periods. Others imply that the mechanism
is emotional, that is, that people’s ingroup identifica-
tion increases in reaction to fear of the now more salient
outgroup (Higashijima and Nakai 2016). This brings us
to intergroup attitudes more generally. The salience of
ethnicity—and specifically of ethnic differences—also in-
creases outgroup aversion (linkC). People aremore aware
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FIGURE 1 Hypothesized Changes in Intergroup Relations during Elections
Note: The figure, including both full and dashed arrows, depicts how the polarization framework expects intergroup relations to
change over the electoral process due to the increased salience of ethnicity. The dashed arrows in addition signify the mechanisms
that the integration framework expects to be blocked during the electoral process despite the increased salience of ethnicity.
of how different “the other” is and, as this happens in the
context of competition, that this difference is negative.
Finally, studies on elections in ethnically diverse soci-
eties also use intergroup threat theory to infer how group
members relate to the polity as a whole, the nation.2 For
members of the dominant group, particularly so if it is a
titular group, identification with the nation is expected
to increase (link D). For members of the nondominant
group, however, national identification is expected to de-
crease as their attitudes toward the group nominally rep-
resenting the nation worsen and their feeling of belong-
ing to that nation decreases (link E). Overall, then, the
polarization framework understands ethnic relations to
be antagonistic in the longer term, with the antagonism
being spurred in the shorter term by intense periods of
politicization, such as elections (see also Weber, Hiers,
and Flesken 2016).
However, some studies suggest that the links between
ethnic group salience and attitudes toward the outgroup
and the superordinate, national group theorized in inter-
group threat theory may be blocked under certain con-
ditions. In Figure 1, these blocked pathways are depicted
with dashed arrows. According to this integration frame-
work, the political salience of ethnicity may not mani-
fest itself in outgroup aversion (link C) and low national
identification (link E) among members of the nondom-
2In this article, the nation as an object to which attitudes or feelings
are extended is understood to be the political community (see
Easton 1965).
inant group if the political system provides them with
access to group representation. Large-scale cross-country
survey analyses find that the minority–majority gap in
feelings of national pride is significantly smaller in coun-
tries with greater political equality (Bu¨hlmann andHa¨nni
2012; Ray 2018; Staerkle´ et al. 2010).3 Examining ethnic
group behavior, Birnir (2007) shows that the incidence of
political violence is significantly lower where minorities
have access to power through institutional means such as
proportional representation.
Amongmembers of thedominant group, thepolitical
salience of ethnicity does not lead to increased outgroup
aversion (link C) if they learn, over one or more election
cycles, that minority representation does not endanger
their own interests.Hajnal (2001) shows thatwhiteAmer-
icans’ attitudes toward blacks improve after experiencing
blackmayoral leadership. Similarly, BarackObama’s elec-
tion as U.S. president reduced whites’ prejudice toward
blacks (Goldman 2012; Welch and Sigelman 2011).
Yet in this integration framework, both the attitudi-
nal changes among minority and majority group mem-
bers are the outcome of either longer-term processes or
first-time experiences, in which members learn that they
do not need to feel threatened by the respective out-
group and update their views on that group. But for an
election in a political system with long-standing ethnic
minority representation, as is the case in Romania, we
3But see Elkins and Sides (2007).
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would expect that this learning process has already taken
place; as the links are blocked, the short-term electoral
process itself should not have a discernible effect on inter-
group relations, even if it temporally increases the salience
of ethnicity (Figure 1, link A) and, with it, ingroup iden-
tification (link B).
Common Ingroup Identity
The field’s strong focus on antagonistic intergroup re-
lations results in an oversight of alternative theories to
intergroup threat. Moreover, its focus on ethnic relations
ignores one of the key constructivist insights that people
have a multiplicity of identities of varying salience (see
Chandra 2012); ethnic identity may not always be the
most salient identity, even during electoral competition.
The assumed automaticity of intergroup threat—barring
the interference of contextual roadblocks—reduces con-
structivism to a form of “as-if primordialism”: Although
ethnic groups may be constructed, once they are con-
structed, they are seen to behave as if theywere primordial
(see also Kalyvas 2008). I argue that elections in ethnically
diverse societies do not necessarily worsen intergroup re-
lations but may even improve them, as the electoral pro-
cess increases not only the salience of ethnic groups but
also that of the common superordinate, national identity.
The argument is motivated by findings from social
and political psychology that question the automaticity of
intergroup threat, as understood in the literature on eth-
nic politics. First, increased ingroup identification does
not necessarily lead to increased outgroup antagonism
(Brewer 2001; Reicher 2004). Davis and Brown (2002)
show that African Americans with a strong black social
identity do not automatically harbor greater antipathy to-
ward whites than those with weaker black social identity.
Gibson’s (2006) study on South Africa finds no evidence
that strong ingroup identities lead to political or racial
intolerance. Moreover, any ingroup bias is largely the re-
sult of enhancing the ingroup rather than of devaluing the
outgroup (Brewer 2001)—and intergroup contact can re-
duce the ingroup–outgroup differential (Pettigrew 1998).
This intergroup contact theory is the main competitor to
the intergroup threat theory in social psychology.
A second set of studies questioning the automaticity
of intergroup threat finds that increased ingroup
identification does not necessarily lead to decreased
national identification among minorities (Sidanius and
Petrocik 2001). In the United States, de la Garza, Falcon,
and Garcia (1996) find that Mexican American citizens
are equally or even more patriotic than Anglo American
citizens, whereas Citrin, Wong, and Duff (2001) con-
clude that ethnic and national identities are generally
complementary rather than competing. In multicountry
studies, Dowley and Silver (2000) only get mixed results,
suggesting that exogenous factors affect the relationship,
and Elkins and Sides (2007) find that minorities can feel
attached to both the ethnic group and the nation at once.
This simultaneity of nested group identities is taken
into account in the common ingroup identity model in
social psychology, aligning itwith constructivist theoryon
ethnic politics. Themodel argues that a common ingroup
identity such as national identity can extend or redirect
“the cognitive and motivational processes that produce
positive feelings toward ingroupmembers to former out-
groupmembers” (Gaertner, Dovidio, andBachman 1996,
271; see also Gaertner and Dovidio 2009). That is, when
the common ingroup is made salient and people see each
other as fellow members of a shared group, antagonism
between the subordinate groups and, with it, any ingroup
bias decreases.
In social psychology, the model is supported by var-
ious laboratory experiments, survey studies, and field
experiments (see Gaertner and Dovidio 2009). In po-
litical science, Transue (2007) shows that making the na-
tional identity salient to U.S. study participants improves
intergroup relations by reducing the social distance to
citizens of different racial backgrounds. Similarly, Leven-
dusky (2017) shows that highlighting the commonAmer-
ican national identity decreases affective polarization be-
tween Democrat and Republican partisans. Beyond the
U.S. context, increasing the salience of shared national
identity has been found to increase pro-social behavior
between Hindus andMuslims in India (Charnysh, Lucas,
and Singh 2015), as well as trust across ethnic boundaries
in Malawi (Robinson 2016).
In these studies, national identity was primed in ex-
perimental conditions, except for one study in Leven-
dusky (2017), in which he examines the priming effect of
Independence Day celebrations. Yet it is reasonable that
general elections may also serve as a primer of broader
national identity, particularly in its civic aspect of a politi-
cal community.4 First, ethnic parties are rarely concerned
with issues pertaining to ethnic group interests alone but
also campaign on general interest issues like taxation or
foreign affairs. Second, ethnic parties are rarely the only,
let alone the biggest, parties in any election. Often polit-
ical parties portray their policy positions as affecting the
country and its future as a whole, and the mobilization
4Nations are often defined in either civic or ethnic terms (Kohn
1944), but citizens tend to see both aspects of nationhood (see,
e.g., Wright, Citrin, andWand 2012). The focus here is on the civic
aspect, on the nation as political community: a group of people
bound together through a will for the political division of labor, an
object toward which support may or may not flow (Easton 1965).
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efforts of campaigns build political efficacy and social
capital among the citizenry (Banducci and Stevens 2015;
Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1999). Citizens may therefore
also have a heightened awareness of their membership in
a wider political community.
The common ingroup framework as well as the po-
larization and integration frameworks can be put to the
test by observing changes in intergroup attitudes during
an election period. Table 1 summarizes the changes in
ingroup identification, outgroup attitudes, and national
identification we would expect according to each frame-
work for citizens from three different constellations of
ethnic group relations: those in the overall majority and
those in the overall minority, as well as those citizens
of the majority group living in areas dominated by the
minority.
The common ingroup framework would lead us to
expect an increase in both ingroup and national identifi-
cation for each group, and—as a consequence of perceiv-
ing the respective ethnic outgroup as part of the shared
national ingroup—also more positive attitudes toward
that outgroup (Table 1c). In both the polarization frame-
work and the integration framework (Table 1a and Ta-
ble 1b, respectively), ingroup identification also increases
for all groups, though in the polarization framework the
increase is likely stronger among the two minority pop-
ulations, as for these groups the intergroup threat is felt
more keenly. Accordingly, the change in outgroup atti-
tudes and national identification is also stronger for these
two groups than for the majority population, with the
overall minority population experiencing a marked de-
cline in national identification. In the integration frame-
work, on the other hand, we would expect no change in
outgroup aversion or national identification in any group
over the short term once a learning process has taken
place over the longer term.
The Study
Ethnicity in Romanian Politics
According to the 2011 census (Institutul Național de
Statistica˘ 2011), Romania’s slightly over 20 million peo-
ple are divided into over 20 recognized ethnic groups,
including ethnic Romanians, who comprise 83.5% of the
population. The largest ethnic minority is that of Hun-
garians, with 6.1% of the population, followed by Roma
at 3.1%, and Ukrainians, Germans, and Turks at 0.2%
each. While ethnic minorities are scattered across Roma-
nia, they are most numerous in the historical region of
Transylvania in the center and northwest of the country,
wheremuchof theHungarianpopulation is concentrated.
In the counties of Harghita and Covasna, Hungarians are
even in the numerical majority, with 71.6 and 82.9% of
the population, respectively.5
Upuntil the beginningof the twentieth century,Hun-
garians were the socially, economically, and politically
dominant population in Transylvania. This changed in
the interwar period and particularly in the communist
era, when the influence of Hungarians and Hungarian
language and culture were curtailed. Following the fall
of communism, the 1990s saw minority mobilization for
community rights as well as political backlash among the
majority population, with violent manifestations (Birnir
2007; Stroschein 2012). Nowadays, ethnicity still plays a
role in Romanian elections. A number of minority or-
ganizations compete for reserved seats, one assigned to
each recognized minority (see King and Marian 2012).
The relatively large size of the Hungarian minority, how-
ever, allows Hungarian politicians to clear the 5% vote
threshold, and they hence compete not for a reserved seat
but for proportional representationon the general ballot.6
The largest Hungarian party is the Democratic Alliance
of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR; Uniunea Democrata˘
Maghiara˘ din Romaˆnia / Roma´niai Magyar Demokrata
Szo¨vetse´g). Since the 1990s, the DAHR has consistently
obtained at least 80% of the Hungarian vote and thus
parliamentary representation (Kiss and Sze´kely 2016).
While the DAHR is ideologically flexible enough to
serve as coalition partner to Romanian parties from both
the left and right in parliamentary politics, Hungarian
minority rights are high on its official agenda and in its
contact with its constituency (Andriescu and Gherghina
2012; Kiss and Sze´kely 2016). According to the Ethnona-
tionalism in Party Competition data set, which summa-
rizes country experts’ coding of the importance of eth-
nic issue positions to various parties in Eastern Europe
(Szo¨csik and Zuber 2015), ethnonationalism, cultural au-
tonomy, education in and of Hungarian, the use of Hun-
garian language, and territorial autonomy are highly im-
portant to the party (coded as at least 9 on a 0–10 scale).
According to a 2013 survey, the Hungarian electorate
is confident that the DAHR effectively represents their
community’s interests in national government, more
so than any other Hungarian party (Kiss and Sze´kely
2016).
5For a map and group sizes per county, see Figure A1 in the
supporting information.
6The Romanian electoral system returned to proportional repre-
sentation (PR) after having switched to a majoritarian system for
the 2008 and 2012 elections. The previous switch from PR to a ma-
joritarian system in 2008 had not led to different voting behavior or
expectations (Marian and King 2010), such that the reverse switch
in 2016 should not have resulted in different attitudinal dynamics.
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TABLE 1 Expected Effects of Elections with Ethnic Politicization on Intergroup Relations among
Ethnic Groups of Different Power Status







(a) Polarization Overall majority + – +
Majority in minority ++ – ++
Overall minority ++ – –
(b) Integration Overall majority + 0 0
Majority in minority + 0 0
Overall minority + 0 0
(c) Common ingroup identity Overall majority + + +
Majority in minority + + +
Overall minority + + +
Note: The signs illustrate the expected changes in attitudes concerning intergroup relations (columns) among ethnic groups of different
power status (rows) over the election period, according to the polarization, integration, and common ingroup identity frameworks. Two
signs indicate that the effect is expected to be relatively stronger, compared to one sign.
Ethnic issues are not just a fringe concern of the
minority parties in the reserved seats or of the DAHR:
When examining the same issues for mainstream Roma-
nian parties, issue importance ranges from 3.4 for the use
of the Hungarian language to 6 on ethnonationalism, to
which they are largely opposed. Adding the issue impor-
tance of the nationalist Greater Romania Party increases
the numbers further (Szo¨csik and Zuber 2015). That is,
while possibly not as central to party programs as, for
example, the economy or foreign policy, ethnic concerns
do play a role for Romanian political parties too (see also
Andriescu and Gherghina 2012).
The December 2016 general elections were no differ-
ent. While the DAHR campaign covered general topics
such as the economy, education, infrastructure, and rural
development (DAHR 2016b) and advocated peaceful in-
terethnic coexistence (DAHR 2016e), Hungarian minor-
ity representation was at the heart of the campaign. The
party advocated the extension of existing minority rights
(e.g., DAHR 2016i; DAHR 2016l) but also warned of their
rollback, evidenced, it argued, among others by “an attack
on the entire Hungarian community” in the form of the
court-mandated closure of a Hungarian-language school
in Taˆrgu Mureș (e.g., DAHR 2016a).
To clear the 5% threshold and thus be able to pre-
serve Hungarian rights, the DAHR increasingly called on
Hungarians to vote. The message was reinforced by Hun-
garian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (DAHR 2016g) as
well as by entrepreneurs, who likened DAHR representa-
tion to the “survival of Hungarians” (DAHR 2016j), and
by church leaders, who equated the act of voting to a “re-
ligious duty” (DAHR 2016f) to protect the community
(DAHR 2016d). On Election Day, the DAHR reported
on mass text messages sent by Romanian nationalist
politicians to encourage Romanians to vote, as this could
prevent Hungarian representation in parliament (DAHR
2016k). This report followed warnings of increased levels
of anti-Hungarianism in Romanian society more gener-
ally (DAHR 2016c). The DAHR campaign hence clearly
politicized the ethnic boundary between Hungarians and
Romanians and increased its salience. In the end, theparty
cleared the electoral threshold with 6.2% of votes, result-
ing in 21 seats in the lower chamber and nine seats in the
senate. It does not form part of the government, but is in
a confidence-and-supply agreement with the governing
coalition of the Social Democracy Party (Partidul Social
Democrat) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats
(Alianța Liberalilor și Democraților).
The Romanian Election Panel Study
The election campaign thus had the potential to polarize
ethnic relations, particularly so in the counties in which
the Hungarian population is concentrated and in which
Romanians are in the minority. To assess the dynamics of
ethnic relations, I conducted a panel survey surrounding
the general elections onDecember 11, 2016.The firstwave
was conducted 4–6 weeks before Election Day, before the
official campaign start on November 11 (OSCE/ODIHR
2016); the second wave was 4 weeks after, in mid-January
2017.7 The survey included questions concerning respon-
dents’ political interest; party affiliations, voting behavior,
7Wave 1: October 24–November 7, 2016; Wave 2: January 9–24,
2017. The DAHR launched its election manifesto on November 6,
2016 (DAHR 2016h).
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and perceptions of electoral fairness; satisfaction with the
economy, government, and democracy; social trust; na-
tional identity; group identification and relations; and
demographic information. In this article, I examine three
key sets of questions covering ethnic relations: belong-
ing to one’s own ethnic group, evaluation of the respec-
tive outgroup, and belonging to the national political
community.
To assess the effects of elections on ethnic relations,
I surveyed representative samples of voting-age respon-
dents living in three different constellations of ethnic
group relations: (a) Romanians living in the majoritar-
ian Hungarian counties of Harghita and Covasna (n =
401 in both waves); (b) Romanians in majoritarian Ro-
manian counties (n = 417; in the following, “national
Romanians”); and (c) Hungarians in counties in which
they make up a substantial share (n = 423).8 The initial
response rate was 65.8%, in line with other large-scale
representative surveys, and the attrition rate was com-
paratively low at 8.3%, with no apparent bias in attrition
across samples.9
With the three samples, it is possible to examine all
links in the theoretical chains described in Figure 1 and
Table 1, by observing changes in the majority population
and the minority population, as well as the majority pop-
ulation living inminority-dominant counties. Among the
latter two samples, any election effect should be particu-
larly strong because it is here that the DAHR focuses its
electoral campaign, whereas mainstream parties present
themselves as “defenders of the ‘Romanian minority’” in
Harghita and Covasna and unite against the Hungarian
vote in more balanced counties (Kiss and Sze´kely 2016,
604).
The panel survey design has several advantages over
other research designs. In contrast to cross-sectional sur-
veys, it allows identification of not only aggregate but also
individual change over time, and thus also for more con-
fident identification of causality (Lynn 2009). In contrast
to many experimental designs, the panel survey design
lends external, and specifically ecological, validity to the
results, as it covers attitude change among representative
samples and in real-world contexts rather than in simu-
lations (Holbrook 2011).
8The Hungarian survey was conducted in Bihor, Cluj, Covasna,
Harghita, Mures, and Satu Mare (see Figure A1).
9See Table A1. Initial response is unlikely to be biased along in-
terethnic attitudes, as the survey was introduced as an election
study, without mention of a focus on ethnic relations. Neither is
there an apparent bias by media attention or political interest (see
Table A2). Data on demographic representativeness are presented
in Table A3.
Results
I examine the data for their fit with the expectations de-
rived from the polarization, integration, and common
identity framework (compare Table 1). I first examine
differences between samples and changes within samples
for the three outcomes of interest—ingroup identifica-
tion, outgroup attitudes, and national identification—
followed by additional tests of the common ingroup iden-
tity framework and of alternative explanations. The vari-
ables and methods used are described in the respective
sections.
Ingroup Identification
To test the first set of hypotheses concerning ingroup
identification, I use two questions:10 “On a scale of 0–10,
how important is being [Romanian/Hungarian] for you
personally?” “I am going to ask you to use a scale like
a thermometer to express your evaluation of members
of this group. 100 degrees means you typically evaluate
them to be extremely favorable, 50 degrees means neither
favorable nor unfavorable, and 0degreesmeans extremely
unfavorable.” Responses to the importance and feeling
thermometer questions are strongly associated with each
other ( 2w1 = 513.49,  2w2 = 862.06, p< .001), and after
rescaling the latter to range from 0 to 10, I create an index
out of their mean.
The results for ingroup identification do point to
changes associatedwith the election, as hypothesized in all
three frameworks (Figure 2a).11 In Wave 1, identification
is relatively high for all three samples, with mean values
8.76 to 8.90 on a 0–10 scale; the means do not differ
significantly between samples. The values increase even
further in Wave 2, by an average of 0.22 points among
national Romanians and 0.45 amongHungarians. But the
strongest increase occurs among Romanians living in the
Hungarian-majority counties of Harghita and Covasna,
with a mean increase of almost 1 point. All changes are
significantly different from 0 (pw2-w1  .004). although
the changes may appear relatively small, they amount
to an increase of up to 11 percentage points, and that
despite a likely ceiling effect. The results are in accordance
with intergroup threat theory, and hence the polarization
and integration frameworks, in that they suggest that the
election more strongly affected the majority population
in counties in which they are not dominant, perhaps as
a backlash against Hungarian election rhetoric. However,
10The exact wordings for these and all subsequent questions are
provided in Table A4 in the supporting information.
11Precise figures are reported in Table A5.
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FIGURE 2 Mean Values per Sample and SurveyWave
(a) (b) (c)
Note: The x-axes indicate the survey wave in relation to the electoral process, and the y-axes indicate the sample mean in ingroup
identification, outgroup attitudes, and national identification, respectively, during these waves. Dotted lines are meant to visually
aid the reader in the pre–post election comparison. H&C=Harghita and Covasna. Error bars illustrate the 95% confidence intervals
of the means. Figure produced with R package ggplot (Wickham 2016).
they do not inform us whether perceived threat is indeed
the mechanism behind increased ingroup identification.
Outgroup Attitudes
For the second set of hypotheses concerning outgroup
attitudes, I use the same thermometer question as above,
but for the respective outgroup. Figure 2b describes
between- and within-sample differences in outgroup
attitudes. Note that values below 5 signify outgroup
aversion, 5 neutrality, and those above 5 affinity. In
Wave 1, all samples report outgroup affinity. Among
national Romanians, the extent of affinity is limited at
5.34, but among Romanians in Harghita and Covasna
and among Hungarians, affinity is relatively high—and
significantly higher than among national Romanians—at
values above 7. This pre-election result alone suggests that
intergroup contact rather than threat theory is applica-
ble in the Romanian context: In counties with a higher
probability of intergroup contact, between-group affinity
is stronger than in counties with a lower probability of
intergroup contact.
Just as for ingroup identification, outgroup affinity
increases between waves for all three samples. Among na-
tional Romanians and Hungarians, the increase is about
1 point, while among Romanians in Harghita and Cov-
asna, the increase is almost twice that with 1.84 points. All
increases are statistically significant (pw2-w1 < .001). The
election thus did not have a polarizing effect on ethnic
relations: On the contrary, outgroup affinity increased
among all samples, and most among Romanians who
would be most strongly affected by the minority’s in-
crease in power. Hungarians, too, report increased affin-
ity toward Romanians, so neither can it be said that the
minority is being incited against the majority.
National Identification
To test the third set of hypotheses on national identifica-
tion, I also create an index of the mean of the responses
to two questions: “To what extent are you proud of being
a citizen of Romania?” and “On a scale of 0 to 10, to what
extent do you agree with the following statement? It is
important to me to promote a positive image of Romania
in contact with foreigners or when I go abroad” ( 2w1 =
1,240.2,  2w2 = 838.06, p< .001).
Figure 2c describes between- and within-group dif-
ferences in national identification. In Wave 1, the mean
is, not surprisingly, lowest among Hungarians, but still
relatively high at 6.61 on a 0–10 scale. And even though
it is higher among Romanians in Harghita and Covasna,
at 8.09, this value is still significantly smaller than that of
national Romanians, which lies at 8.64. The latter value
does not substantively change in Wave 2, possibly due
to the already high value in Wave 1. However, national
identification increases among Romanians in Harghita
and Covasna by more than 1 point to 9.16, and among
ETHNIC PARTIES, ETHNIC TENSIONS? 9
Hungarians by nearly 2 points to 8.51. The changes differ
significantly from each other as well as from zero.
The data therefore indicate that in the time between
the survey panels, national identification among national
Romanians was relatively stable and that that among Ro-
manians in Harghita and Covasna and among Hungar-
ians increased substantially. Moreover, national identi-
fication among Romanians in Harghita and Covasna is
now significantly higher than among national Romani-
ans. Both this and the stark increase among Hungarians
again strongly suggests that the election campaign did not
have a polarizing effect, as otherwise national identifica-
tion should have decreased or, at the very least, remained
stable among Hungarians.
Individual- and Subsample-Level Changes
The aggregate analysis so far has shown that ingroup
identification, outgroup affinity, and national identifica-
tion all increased in all three samples, pointing away from
both the polarization and integration frameworks and
toward the common ingroup framework. To avoid eco-
logical fallacies, I also examine whether this association
holds when disaggregating the data.
First, thenationalRomanian sample includes respon-
dents from counties in Transylvania, other than Harghita
and Covasna, and the rest of the country. As intergroup
tensions have historically been highest in Transylvania, it
is necessary to examine whether the threat-based frame-
works apply to this region, if not outside of it. However,
looking at Romanian respondents living in Transylva-
nia (specifically, in Bihor and Cluj) supports the argu-
ment set out so far: Although ingroup identification in-
creases significantly, again suggesting higher salience of
intergroup relations in these counties, national identifica-
tion also increases and outgroup attitudes do not worsen
in Transylvania either (see Figure A2 in the supporting
information).
Second, the Hungarian sample includes respondents
from counties where they are in the clear majority
(Harghita andCovasna) and fromcountieswhere they are
in the minority. Threat and contact dynamics may work
differently in these contexts; for example, majority Hun-
garians may be more resistant to the idea of a common
ingroup identity than minority Hungarians, who have
more opportunity for outgroup contact. However, ma-
jority Hungarians show a significantly and substantially
higher increase in ingroup identification, outgroup affin-
ity, and national identification than minority Hungari-
ans (Figure A3 in the supporting information), suggest-
ing that the election period fostered a common ingroup
TABLE 2 Correlations between Ingroup,
Outgroup, and National Attitude
Change Scores per Sample
Ingroup Outgroup
Romanian (national) Outgroup .21
Nation .68 .12




Note: Numbers represent correlation coefficients (r) between
changes in the respective attitudes between the pre- and post-
election survey wave at the individual level. H&C = Harghita and
Covasna
identity particularly among those for whom it may not
have been as prevalent before.
Finally, I examine whether the simultaneity of in-
creases in ingroup identification, outgroup affinity, and
national identification holds not only at the aggregate
level but also at the individual level. A series of simple
correlations shows that the change scores of all three out-
comes are positively correlatedwith each other in all three
samples (Table 2). Among national Romanians, the cor-
relations between change in ingroup identification and
outgroup attitudes are not particularly large, but posi-
tive (r = .21). The largest correlation in this sample is
that between the change scores in ingroup and national
identification, which indicates that the ingroup identity
of Romanians, as the titular group, is strongly associated
with national identity. Among Romanians in Harghita
and Covasna, as well as among Hungarians, change in
ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes is more
strongly positively correlated (r = .46 and .55, respec-
tively). That is, among respondents in the samples with
the highest rate of intergroup contact, we see a stronger
increase in outgroup affinity where there is also an in-
crease in ingroup identity. To reiterate, this result aligns
more strongly with the general intergroup contact theory
on which the common ingroup framework is based than
with the intergroup threat theory explicitly or implicitly
underlying much of the literature on ethnic conflict in
political science.
Common Ingroup Identity
The stark increase in national identification through-
out the population suggests that the common identity
has indeed been primed over the election period in be-
tween the two survey waves. The datamay lend additional
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Sample n meanw1 pw1 meanw2 pw2 meanw2-w1 pw2-w1
Romanian (national) 388 3.456 2.992 –0.464 .009
Romanian (H&C) 394 1.010 <.001 0.619 <.001 –0.391 .002
Hungarian 420 0.717 <.001 0.591 <.001 –0.126 .095
Note: n = valid observations; w1 = pre-election wave; w2 = post-election wave; pw1 and pw2 = significance values of two-tailed t-tests of
mean differences between the Romanian (national) sample and the other two samples in the respective wave; pw2-w1 = significance values
of one-tailed t-tests testing whether the change in within-sample means is negative; H&C = Harghita and Covasna.
evidence for the common ingroup framework. First, if the
common ingroup framework is correct and an emphasis
on the superordinate identity refocuses ingroup bias from
the ethnic group to the national ingroup, we should also
see a decrease in social distance between groups (see also
Transue 2007). I examine social distance with the dif-
ferences between the ingroup and outgroup feeling ther-
mometers.
Table 3 reports the values for ingroup bias per sample
in Wave 1 and Wave 2, and their differences. It is evident
that national Romanians generally have a significantly
and substantively higher ingroup bias than the other
two samples, with feelings toward the ingroup nearly 3.5
points higher than feelings toward the outgroup. This
again points toward the intergroup contact theory, with
those respondents in areas with higher intergroup contact
(specifically, Harghita and Covasna) having lower biases.
But among national Romanians, just as for Romanians in
Harghita and Covasna, the ingroup bias decreases signifi-
cantly inWave 2, showing that the election period indeed
coincides with an improvement in interethnic relations.
Among Hungarians it decreases too, and although it is
only significant at the .1 level, this is so despite the already
very low level of ingroup bias among Hungarians before
the elections: 79.3% of all Hungarians show an ingroup
bias of 0 or 1 in Wave 1, whereas only 65.7% of Harghita
and Covasna Romanians do so.
Second, the common identity frameworkmay be fur-
ther tested by examining attitudes toward pro-social be-
havior. Field experimental studies on the nation as com-
mon ingroup identity have shown that salienceof national
identity triggers greater support for redistribution and
pro-social behavior across ethnic boundaries (Charnysh,
Lucas, and Singh 2015; Robinson 2016; Transue 2007).
De Cremer and van Vugt (1999) explain such changes
with increased value being assigned to the public good.
Therefore, if the superordinate, national identity and, in
particular, its political aspecthavebeeneffectivelyprimed,
we would also expect an increase in respondents’ support
TABLE 4 Within-Sample, Between-Wave
Differences inWillingness to Pay Taxes
in Full
Sample n meanw1 meanw2 meanw2-w1 pw2-w1
Romanian
(national)
414 7.237 8.068 0.831 <.001
Romanian
(H&C)
398 7.844 8.214 0.369 .012
Hungarian 404 6.743 7.661 0.918 0.001
Note: n = valid observations; w1 = pre-election wave; w2 = post-
election wave; pw2-w1 = significance values of one-tailed t-tests
testing whether the change in within-sample means is positive;
H&C = Harghita and Covasna.
for the public good, here examined with their willing-
ness to support the state by paying their taxes in full. As
Table 4 shows, this is indeed the case: Respondents in all
three samples are significantly more willing to pay their
taxes in full after the elections than before. Both ingroup
bias and tax attitudes hence provide further evidence for
the common ingroup framework.
Discussion
The positive association between ingroup identification,
outgroup attitudes, and national identification over the
election period rejects the assumptions of both the polar-
ization and integration frameworks and instead suggests
that national elections serve as a primer of a common
ingroup identity. Here, I discuss potential alternative ex-
planations.
First, might the changes have been caused by factors
other than the elections? Commemorative national hol-
idays and sporting contests, terrorist attacks and natural
disasters, or other short-term events putting a spotlight
on the nation, such as a census, may evoke a sense of
national identification (e.g., Bonikowski 2016). Yet, of
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these, only a few international games and a national hol-
iday occurred between the two survey waves. The games
were nothing out of the ordinary, and the Romanian
teams usually found themselves on the losing side. The
Romanian national holiday on December 1 is for many
merely another day to go out and celebrate, without heed-
ing the national meaning, which makes it unlikely that its
effects are still felt in January. Moreover, the day is not
perceived as a holiday by Hungarians, as it signifies the
unification of Transylvania and Romania in 1918 and to
them represents a loss of power; rather than a day of cele-
bration, it is a “day ofmourning” (Fox 2006, 223).Neither
the sporting contests nor the holiday celebrations could
thus have had the observed effects.
Second, might the timing of the observations not
tell the whole story? For example, although the of-
ficial campaign period began only after completion
of Wave 1, it may be that parties began campaign-
ing earlier and that therefore the attitudes observed in
Wave 1 did not represent “base attitudes” but those al-
ready affected by campaign rhetoric. However, media
use for campaigning is strictly regulated (OSCE/ODIHR
2016), and if the DAHR already campaigned informally
beforehand, it is unlikely to have reached a large enough
number of citizens, particularly Romanians, to have had
a substantial impact. And if it did, there are two pos-
sibilities: The attitudes observed in Wave 2 show either
(a) a continuation or (b) a reversal of this impact. In the
first case, the argument advocated so far that the elec-
tions improved intergroup attitudes holds, but because
the true base attitudes are not known, it is not possible
to pinpoint the extent of the improvement. In the second
case, the observations would indeed suggest a polarizing
campaign effect, but one that does not last and is already
forgotten a few weeks later; the substantive effect of eth-
nic party rhetoric would not be as strong as feared. The
same holds for the argument that polarization should
have been strongest shortly before or on Election Day,
which remained unobserved. Which case is correct can
only be resolved with a follow-up study with more waves
over a longer time period. But in either case, we still ob-
serve that changes in ingroup, outgroup, and supergroup
attitudes are positively associated with each other, rather
than negatively as predicted by the intergroup threat the-
ory, underlining this article’s arguments that it is neces-
sary to look beyond that theory and to examine the dif-
ferent attitudes separately, rather than making inferences
from one to the other.
Third, might the findings be the result of the ques-
tionnaire design? Surveys are prone to social desirability
bias, in which respondents do not report their true atti-
tudes but those they perceive to align with social norms.
If social norms portray ethnic tolerance and multicul-
turalism as desirable, respondents may not be willing to
express the true extent of their ingroup bias. However,
the question most explicitly inquiring about attitudes to-
ward other groups, the feeling thermometer, was phrased
identically to that inquiring about ingroup attitudes, and
the setup was identical in both waves. Social desirability
bias hence cannot explain the change in attitudes be-
tween waves. Instead, attitude change may be explained
by learning effects, or panel conditioning, with respon-
dents updating their response patterns after answering
the same questions earlier. However, updating responses
requires remembering the previous responses, which is
unlikely over the more than 2-month gap between the
survey waves. Moreover, it would be unclear what trig-
gered the learning effect, save perhaps that the election
period acted as a reminder of any social norms on in-
tergroup relations.12 Even if that were the case, it would
qualify the common ingroup framework only to the ex-
tent that it is not indeed the common ingroup itself but
the idea of a common ingroup that effected the change.
Finally, might the changes not have been driven by
considerations of identity, but by those of material ben-
efit? Romanian residents of Harghita and Covasna may
recognize that there are benefits of being represented by
theDAHR, as the indivisible spoils of government partici-
pation are distributed in the region as awhole: Romanians
there, too, will benefit from investments in infrastructure,
housing, and the jobmarket. In this case, wewould expect
an increase in affinity not only toward theHungarian out-
groupbut also toward theDAHR.However,whereas in the
pre-election wave, party affinity for the DAHR is higher
amongRomanians inHarghita andCovasna than in other
regions, it decreases in the post-election wave, such that
party affinity is the same across the country.13 That is,
DAHR support cannot explain why minority Romanians
report increased affinity for Hungarians.14 Moreover, any
such consideration would still not explain the changes
among Hungarians and Romanians elsewhere.
Conclusion
Ethnic parties are often seen to undermine national unity,
as they are thought to politicize ethnic differences and
12Research on attitudinal panel conditioning is in its infancy (Stur-
gis, Allum, and Brunton-Smith 2009).
13See Table A6 in the supporting information.
14Neither is the decrease in party affinity specific to the DAHR but
affects all parties.
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raise their salience, and in doing so increase ingroup co-
hesion and outgroup rivalry. The longitudinal analysis
conducted in this article does not support this polar-
ization framework. Although ingroup identification did
increase, neither outgroup relations nor national identi-
fication worsened.
Neither does the analysis support the integration
framework, according to which intergroup threat is
blocked by contextual factors such as power relations
and the history of intergroup conflict: One may argue
that the elections did not worsen intergroup relations
because Hungarians make up only 6.1% of the popula-
tion and are regionally concentrated in Transylvania. As
such, Romanians outside of Transylvania might not have
been exposed to much of the campaign, and Romanians
may feel that even when Hungarians gain representation,
their power is relatively easily contained. DAHR’s junior
partner position in a variety of government coalitions
may reassure them. That is, the uneven power relations
together with the absence of evidence of a Hungarian
threat may explain the lack of a polarization effect among
Romanians. The same factors may also explain the lack
of a polarization effect among Hungarians, as they have
learned that, despite the uneven power relations, propor-
tional representationprovided themwith theopportunity
to enter parliament and even government. However, the
data do not evidence attitudinal stability but an increase
in outgroup affinity and national identity throughout
the electoral process. That is, the findings at least qual-
ify the mechanisms suggested to underlie the integration
framework, in that the demographic and institutional
context not only block more or less automatic threat dy-
namics engendered by ethnic politicization, but also allow
identities other than ethnicity to become more relevant.
The results invite consideration of alternative hy-
potheses on intergroup relations. Here, I explained the
observed simultaneous increase in all three attitudes with
the main contestant of intergroup threat theory under-
lying the polarization and integration frameworks: in-
tergroup contact theory and its offspring, the common
ingroup identity model. The national nature of elections
raises the salience of a common ingroup identity and in-
spires national identification, and, as a result, antagonism
between the subordinate groups decreases—despite eth-
nic party rhetoric. The effect of ethnic parties may hence
be negligible for interethnic attitudes, whereas national
elections can have a positive effect.
As the discussion of the integration framework
shows, the Romanian context may only allow general-
ization to similarly stable political regimes with similarly
low levels of ethnic tensions; we may obtain a different
picture if we repeated the analysis in societies marred by
systemic discrimination and ethnic violence. Even so, the
findings generalize to a large number of countries with
ethnicdiversity andethnicparties, suchasBelgium,Czech
Republic, Finland, Mauritius, Namibia, New Zealand, or
Peru (Lublin 2014): There, too, ethnic party rhetoric may
not necessarily lead to worsened ethnic tensions. And in
less stable countries, it is necessary to identify how ethnic
party rhetoric may work together with other factors in
fueling ethnic tensions.
The findings presented here question the assumed
automaticity of intergroup threat and invite future stud-
ies to make one’s assumptions about the psychological
processes at work explicit, and then to empirically assess
each of its component parts, rather than to make infer-
ences fromone part about the others. The field’s tendency
to equate ingroup identification with outgroup aversion
or to assume that minority groups and national identifi-
cation are mutually exclusive has resulted in dispropor-
tionate emphasis on intergroup threat to explain ethnic
relations. This also implies that we may not easily make
inferences from attitudes to behavior, and vice versa: For
example, while voting behavior may follow ethnic lines,
this does not necessarily indicate nationalistic tendencies
or outgroup aversion on the part of either the minority
or the majority.15 Future research needs to more clearly
disaggregate interethnic attitudes and behavior in theory
and practice, and to explore these in both international
and intranational comparison.
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